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Abstract
Discontinuities as a crucial aspect of economic systems have been discussed
both verbally - particularly in institutionalist theory - and formally, chiefly
using catastrophe theory. Catastrophe theory has, however, been criticized
heavily for lacking micro-foundations and has mainly fallen out of use in
economics and social sciences. The present paper proposes a simple catas-
trophe theory model of technological change with network externalities and
reevaluates the value of such a model by adding an agent-based micro layer.
To this end an agent-based variant of the model is proposed and investi-
gated specifically with regard to the network structure among the agents.
While the macro level of the model produces a classical cusp catastrophe
- a result that is preserved in the agent-based form - it is found that the
behavior of the model changes locally depending on the network structure,
especially if networks with features that resemble social networks (low di-
ameter, high clustering, power law distributed node degree) are considered.
Preprint submitted to Elsevier November 26, 2015
While the present work investigates merely an aspect out of a large pos-
sibility space, it encourages further research using agent-based catastrophe
theory models especially of economic aspects to which catastrophe theory
has previously successfully been applied; aspects such as technological and
institutional change, economic crises, or industry structure.
Keywords:
network structures; agent-based modeling; catastrophe theory; information
and communication technology; preferential attachment networks;
technological change
1. Introduction1
Path dependence and discontinuity have been central issues for institu-2
tional and evolutionary economics since at least Gunnar Myrdal’s introduc-3
tion of the idea of Circular Cumulative Causation (see, e.g., [16]), possibly4
much longer (specifically since Thorstein Veblen’s [28, 29] writings on Cumu-5
lative Causation and path dependence in history, institutions, and fashion6
goods). A formal framework to capture these concepts presented itself with7
Rene´ Thom’s [27] analysis of catastrophe theory. It has since been applied8
to different aspects of economic systems [32, 14, 15, 19, 10] both with and9
without the framework of institutionalist theory and evolutionary economics.10
Catastrophe theory models in economics do, however, generally operate at11
3
an aggregate level only; in fact, they became controversial in the 1990s (for12
an overview, see, e.g., [20]). Consideration of, for instance, group or network13
structures would transform the model into a set of distinct but overlapping14
models, thereby increasing the system’s complexity by orders of magnitude.15
The present paper reevaluates a simple catastrophe theory model of tech-16
nological change with network externalities by adding an agent-based micro17
layer. To this end an agent-based variant of the model is proposed and in-18
vestigated with specific regard to the network structure among agents. The19
technological-institutional layer of the model is very simple; a base technol-20
ogy is contrasted with a new innovative technology that they may adopt.21
The latter generates network externalities for the adopters but they also in-22
cur (fixed) costs that arise periodically. The model uses a simple evolutionary23
mechanism (a replicator dynamic with a capacity boundary) for defining the24
probabilities for agents to adopt the new technology. The network external-25
ity enters this function as a standard intensity term while the periodic costs26
are applied additively. This yields a polynomial of degree 3 which can be27
reduced to the canonical equation of a cusp catastrophe (for overviews on28
cusp catastrophes, see, e.g., [23, 21, 20]) by applying the linear Tschrinhaus29
transformation. While the macro level of the model thus produces a clas-30
4
sical cusp catastrophe - a result that is preserved in the agent-based form31
- it is found that the behavior of the model changes locally with the net-32
work structure. The network structure affects the distribution of the agent’s33
neighborhood sizes (number of directly connected agents). The agent will34
then base her decisions to adopt or abandon the new technology on her35
neighborhood rather than the entire population. Depending on the network36
structure, different local neighborhoods may persist in different adoption37
states (specifically for small world networks) and the theoretical equilibria of38
the underlying macro-level equation may exhibit different degrees of stabil-39
ity and sensitivity depending on the network structure. In turn, the network40
structure affects the general catastrophic or non-catastrophic outcomes as41
well when the slow variables (the catastrophe parameters, namely the cost42
and the capacity boundary) are included in the simulation, i.e. when the43
catastrophe is allowed to happen.44
While the present work investigates merely an aspect out of a large pos-45
sibility space, it encourages further research using agent-based catastrophe46
theory models especially of economic aspects to which catastrophe theory47
has previously successfully been applied; aspects such as technological and48
institutional change, economic crises, or industry structure.49
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In section 2, a more detailed overview of the literature on both network50
externalities and catastrophe theory in economic systems will be given. Sec-51
tion 3 proceeds with a simple theoretical model of an industry subject to52
network externality that results in a classical cusp catastrophe. This model53
will then be extended to an agent-based version and the role of the network54
structure and other aspects on the behavior of the model will be studied in55
section 4. section 5 concludes.56
2. Literature Review57
Catastrophe theory was established and developed as a field of mathe-58
matics in the 1970s, mainly by Rene´ Thom [27]. It immediately enjoyed59
some popularity and applications to many fields including economics and so-60
cial sciences (see, e.g. Woodcock and Davis [32]) were developed but it was61
heavily criticized and has largely fallen out of use. One of the main critiques62
focusses on it being rooted in simple macro-level dynamic systems without63
relating to a micro level (microfoundation). For a brief overview, see Rosser64
[19] However, this should neither disqualify an entire class of models if it65
is able to describe or approximate observed phenomena nor is it generally66
impossible to add micro-foundations to such a model.67
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The current paper attempts to describe technological change with net-68
work externalities using a catastrophe model (and to add proper microfoun-69
dations with an agent-based version in section 4). This field has long been70
recognized as falling out of the domain of most earlier models in economics71
since there are increasing returns to scale driven by and increased willing-72
ness to pay higher prices for access to more well-established networks. This73
leads to path dependent technology choice processes as extensively analyzed74
by, e.g., Arthur and Ermoliev, and Kaniovski [2, 1], as well as (in a less75
formal-mathematical way) David [7]. The basic argument is that switching76
of technologies is costly and can, if it depends on others switching as well77
only be done with coordination - even if the intent is to switch to a new78
technology that would clearly be better than the old one. It was, however,79
long before this that it was recognized that technological change occurs in80
waves, as paradigm change rather than as a continuous process. The original81
idea is mainly due to Schumpeter, but the field was advanced greatly in the82
1980s by, among others, Dosi [9] and Freeman and Perez [12] whose papers83
also include discussions of the earlier literature. More recent research has84
brought these two approaches (path dependent technology choice ans tech-85
nological change) together [31, 25, 8] and has applied this to the research on86
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and explanation of growth cycles [24].87
While the discontinuous nature of this phenomenon is obvious, catastro-88
phe models have rarely been applied to the field of technological change.89
Herbig [14] proposed that this could be done without, however, providing a90
model. Two different later approaches, those by Lange et al. [15] and by91
Dou and Ghose [10], followed Herbig’s idea and added catastrophe models92
for specific cases, software adoption (Dou and Ghose) and online retail trade93
(Lange et al.) respectively. The two models are, however, not particularly94
close to the present one and use on different effects to derive the catastrophe95
equation. Both also remain focused on their particular case studies and nei-96
ther comment on potential further uses of catastrophe models in the field of97
technological change or in social and economic systems as a whole nor do they98
address the earlier criticism of catastrophe models lacking microfoundation99
(which is why they do not attempt to proceed to replicate the macro-level100
catastrophe model in an agent-based approach).101
3. A Simple Model102
Similar to Dou and Ghose’s approach [10], the basis of the present model103
is the canonical replicator dynamic equation for population dynamics with104
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capacity boundary (for a general introduction and detailed explanation of105
this approach, see e.g. Nowak [18])106
dS
dt
= αS
(
1 − S
z
)
Here, S is the size of the current user base, z ist the capacity of the in-107
dustry (i.e. the size of the potential user population, the maximum number108
of users), and α is the growth rate (or rather the fitness term that affects the109
growth rate as long as the capacity boundary is not approached) of the user110
base.111
Different from Dou and Ghose, the present model introduces network exter-112
nalities by making the growth rate dependent on the population size, here113
simply α = S. The result is the dynamic system described by the first order114
differential equation (consisting of a third order polynomial)115
dS
dt
= S2
(
1 − S
z
)
= −1
z
S3 + S2
Here, two simple fixed points (only the second one stable) can be found116
at117
9
S = 0
S = z
But so far, the system does not involve catastrophic transitions. It is well118
known that the bifurcations become supercritical (see figure 1) if a negative119
S-intercept is added [23, 21, 20]. Other than in Dou and Ghose, this is not120
introduced as a market interaction polynomial with a denominator of order121
S2,2 but in a more straightforward and simple way as the periodic costs of122
using a technology. This modification is plausible since costs of infrastruc-123
ture, maintenance, and expert knowledge increases linearily in the number of124
different technologies an agent uses while it the additional costs from more125
intensive use of an existing technology (that is, the respective infrastructure)126
are decreasing, possibly even zero.127
128
The resulting equation is129
2Dou and Ghose [10] use such a term to model network effects (and network externali-
ties). The equilibrium set of this model is identical to one given by a polynomial of order
S4 (and without negative powers of S) which they then reduce to cubic order by dividing
by S to develop it into the classical cusp model using the Tschirnhaus transformation in
much the same way as outlined below.
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dS
dt
= αS
(
1 − S
z
)
− β = −1
z
S3 + S2 − β (1)
Since it is the fixed points, the stability and potential catastrophic change130
that is under investigation here, the equilibrium set (i.e. dS
dt
= 0) is what is131
of primary interest in this system. The equilibrium set is132
(
dS
dt
=
)
0 = −1
z
S3 + S2 − β
133
0 = S3 − zS2 + zβ (2)
Using a Tschirnhaus transformation134
S = x+
z
3
the equation becomes135
0 = +
(
x+
z
3
)3
− z
(
x+
z
3
)2
+ zβ
0 = x3 − z
2
3
x− 2z
3
27
+ zβ
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which can be developed into3136
0 = x3 + ax+ b,
the classical cusp catastrophe equation [23, 21, 20].137
138
For the original system (equation 1), the equilibrium surface as stated139
above (equation 2) yields two supercritical bifurcations (together called the140
bifurcation set). They are obtained as the solution of4141
0 = −1
z
S3 + S2 − β
0 = −3
z
S2 + 2S
as142
3By substituting
a = −1
3
z2
and
b = −2z
3
27
+ zβ
.
4That is, the intersection of the equilibrium surface dSdt = 0 with the set of marginal
stability λ = ∂(dS/dt)∂S = 0. The bifurcation set therefore contains all points on the equilib-
rium surface that are marginally stable, indicating that the system’s stability properties
change in the vicinity of the set (or rather at this very point) in the control space (i.e. the
z-β-plane.)
12
β = 0 z = S
β = 1
3
S2 z = 3
2
S
,
more conveniently written (with S eliminated) as β = 0 and 4z2 = 27β.143
The system is shown in figures 1 (transition for changing β), 2 (bifurcation144
set in control space) and 3 (equilibrium surface). Note that for the cusp145
area (between the two bifurcation sets), there are three equilibria, the lower146
and the upper of which are stable while the middle one is not. Outside147
the cusp area, there is only one equilibrium. Consequently, if an additional148
dynamic which modifies the parameters b and Z is introduced, catastrophic149
changes occur, when either of the bifurcations is reached from the stable150
equilibrium plane which does not continue on the other side of the bifurcation.151
Specifically, the interpretation of the two bifurcations is152
1. b = 0: The size of the user base is zero (lower stable equilibrium) and153
the costs become zero - since, e.g. the vendor is supplies the technology154
for free to the first couple of users. The system will then jump to the155
upper stable equilibrium.156
2. 4z2 = 27β: The system is in the upper stable equilibrium and either157
the costs increase beyond the threshold (for given capacity z) or the158
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population shrinks (for given β) below the bifurcation threshold (or a159
combination of the two). In this case, using the technology becomes160
uneconomic fore all its users and the network will collapse (to the lower161
stable equilibrium, i.e. zero size).162
It should be noted, that many modifications to the fitness (growth rate)163
or network externality term α = S leave the properties of the model intact,164
i.e. that this model is generalizable at least to some degree. For instance,165
if the term is a positive linear function of S (with factor f), α = fS, the166
system results in the same pattern of equilibrium surfaces and bifurcations167
with the specific bifurcation set (1) β = 0 and (2) 4z2 = 27β
f
.168
It is nevertheless obvious, that this is too simple a model to capture in-169
teractive usage decisions and other socio-economic system processes relevant170
to network technologies. It certainly can serve for identifying a potential key171
mechanism that may arise in and be relevant to the economics of innovation172
and technology. However, it must now be shown that the effect is preserved173
in systems which take the micro-layer into account, i.e. agent-based models.174
In that case, not only the network externality and the technology diffusion175
(following for instance the above population dynamics) are important factors,176
but the network structure and its properties as well as potential heterogene-177
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Figure 1: The cusp catastrophe: Bifurcations of the system with z = 2, for increasing
β. For 0 < β < 1627
(
= 427z
2
)
there are three equilibria (dS = 0), above and below this
interval, two of the equilibria vanish.
ity of agents become relevant to the dynamic properties and the outcome of178
the resulting system. This will be the focus of section 4.179
4. An Agent-Based Simulation180
This section reconsiders the model developed in section 3 above and trans-181
forms it into an agent based model. Here, the behavior of the population is182
not governed any more by macro-level equations, but all agents make their183
own decisions. These decisions follow the same model (and equations) as184
above but the reference usage share that the agents base their decision on is185
(generally) not the entire population but only the immediate neighborhood186
15
-2
-1
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 0  1  2  3  4  5
β
z
Figure 2: Bifurcation set and cusp area of the model.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium surface of the model including cusp area with three equilibrium
surface points for every point in control space. Note that though the lower equilibrium
surface is below zero, negative network sizes S are not allowed and the equilibrium is
instead at S = 0. Also note that other than in figures 6 through 10, the vertical axis is
absolute network sizes S.
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of the respective agent. As a reference point, the section starts with the187
complete network (i.e. every agent is direct neighbor to every other agent), a188
setting that unsurprisingly yields the same result as the analytical macro-level189
model above, before more complex network topologies are considered. The190
agent-based version of the technology choice model on non-trivial networks191
is related to but not the same as the variously studied models of contagion192
between agents on networks as discussed in the literature review section 2 (of193
particular interest in this respect, Barash et al. [4] investigate discontinuities,194
bifurcation points, etc. of contagion models in Baraba´si-Albert networks).195
The agents base their decision on the same polynomial as in equation 1196
above,197
−1
z
S3 + S2 − β,
this time, however, the resulting quantity is not directly the dynamic198
change of the usage share (since the agent does not control this quantity)199
but the agent’s inclination to join the network (if she is not currently a200
17
subscriber)5201
%+ = min
(
z,max
(
0,−1
z
S3 + S2 − β
))
(3)
or to leave the network (if she currently is a subscriber).202
%− = min
(
z,max
(
0,−1
z
S3 + S2 − β
))
(4)
Three network structures are considered besides the complete network203
(examples of the three network structures are shown in figure 4):204
1. The grid network (figure 4a): Agents are arranged in a 1-dimensional205
order; they are directly connected with their m predecessors and m206
successors in this order Grid networks have a high clustering coefficient,207
but a high diameter (average path length between random nodes). The208
first property resembles social networks, the second does not.209
2. The preferential attachment network (figure 4b): The network is con-210
structed consecutively; every new agent is connected to m agents who211
are already part of the network; she chooses these agents with a prob-212
5The min and max operations guarantee that the resulting probability is between 0
and 1, if % already falls into these limits, the probabilities are more conveniently written
as % and 1 − %.
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ability proportional to their current degree, i.e. well connected nodes213
have a much higher probability to gain even more connections (hence,214
a Baraba´si-Albert network, [3]). The mechanism is known to lead to215
a power law degree distribution. This is not not generally a property216
of social networks as there seems to be a limit to the number of one’s217
stable social relations6, but it may be a realistic way to model net-218
works among social groups, organizations, or firm networks, especially219
in network industries.7 Further, preferential attachement networks are220
characterized by small diameter8 but also (if no other modifications221
have been made to the generating process) by low clustering coefficient.222
The former (small diameter) is also realistic for networks observed in223
reality (e.g. in networks among firms) while the latter (low clustering224
6Dunbar [11] for instance proposed a number of around 300. There are some models
that nevertheless propose using Baraba´si-Albert networks as a model of social networks,
e.g. [4] - the argument of networks among social groups (as opposed to within social
groups) may be relevant to this discussion.
7This has been suggested directly in some models [6, 26], but since both the size of
firms (profits, capital, number of employees) and the degrees of the internet (but also the
sizes of urban centers and many other quantities related to network technologies in one
way or another) are known to be power law distributed [17, 13], this is generally a plausible
assumption related to other stylized facts.
8The diameter of a network is the longest distance (shortest path) between two nodes
in the network. A small diameter compared to the size of the network (number of nodes)
this means that the network are relatively well-connected, more specifically having Watts
and Strogatz’ small world property [30] (or having a huge number of links compared to
the number of nodes, thus being a complete or almost complete network as this would also
lead to a small diameter).
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coefficient) is not as networks between firms, organizations, but also225
between individuals are generally highly clustered.9226
3. A preferential attachment network with triadic closure (figure 4c). In227
order to obtain a network that does not only have a small diameter and228
a degree distribution following a power law, but also a generally higher229
clustering, one can apply start with a Baraba´si-Albert preferential at-230
tachment network and apply triadic closure. After the Baraba´si-Albert231
process completes, a predefined number of open triads - groups of three232
nodes (agents) where one is connected to the other two but the other233
two are not linked directly - are selected and closed (thereby linking the234
unconnected nodes of the triad directly). This network type has other235
interesting properties. It is more likely to contain components that are236
internally well-connected but poorly connected to other components237
of the network (though not isolated), something that is also observed238
in real social networks. Formally, the betweenness centrailty10 distri-239
9These two properties (and the conjunction of these two properties) in social networks
has received particular attention in the small-world network literature [30]; for an extensive
overview, see [22].
10The betweenness centrailty of a node i is the share of shortest path spj,k in the network
between any two nodes (j and k) of which it is part (denoted spj,k(i))
bc(i) =
∑
j 6=k 6=i
spj,k(i)
spj,k
.
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bution of the network changes such that some nodes (the ones with240
a connection to other closely connected components of the network)241
will have extraordinarily high betweenness centrality while most of the242
nodes score very low in this measure. In the other types of networks243
considered here (complete, grid, and preferential attachment without244
triadic closure) the distributions of betweenness centrailty are substan-245
tially more even11 (See figure 5).12246
All simulations in this section have been conducted in networks of 1250247
agents. Figures 6a through 10a for illustration of the simulations show the248
entire equilibrium surface as derived in the simulation. For the stable equilib-249
rium surfaces (darker grey), the simulation is straightforward and accurate;250
for the unstable equilibria (repeller surface, light grey), the location was ap-251
proximated from the approximate borders of the basins of attraction of the252
stable equilibria. Note that other than in figure 3 the vertical axis gives the253
11In fact, the distributions of the node’s betweenness centrality seem to decay according
to a power law for the preferential attachment network and the preferential attachment
network with triadic closure, but with different tail slopes.
12Note that this module uses a breadth-first search algorithm to obtain a single shortest
path between any two nodes. As in regular grids there are always many equally short
paths, one is selected randomly, therefore the computed betweenness centralities differ
slighly between the nodes; the correct result would be a constant and equal value for all
nodes.
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usage network sizes relative to the capacity (population size), S
z
. To show254
the effect of the network structure in more detail, the results of simulations255
with constant z and initial value (z = 4 and S0/z = 0.5) are also shown256
(figures 6b through 10b). This differs from the simulations shown in figures257
6a through 10a in that this does not show the entire equilibrium surface but258
just the convergence point for a specific starting value (S0/z = 0.5).259
Unsurprisingly, the simulation of the complete network (figure 6) results260
in the same picture as obtained from the macro-level development equation261
(figure 6). Note that the S/z-value of the upper sheet of the equilibrium sur-262
face again first declines smoothly in β (like in the theoretical model above);263
this is because the constant cost (β) makes the participation undesirable264
for a part of the population. When the bifurcation set from the theoretical265
model is reached, the triple equilibrium vanishes and just one of the equilib-266
rium surfaces continues to exist (here visible is the part for which the lower267
equilibrium continues to exist; towards the observer).268
This result is still preserved in the case of the grid network (figure 7)269
with the slight difference that the upper equilibrium surface is much lower.270
This is a numerical issue resulting from the low degree of the nodes in this271
network (shown in figure 7 is a network with even node degree 4): If all272
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(a) Grid (double ring)
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(c) Preferential attachment with triadic closure
Figure 4: Networks of the same size (1250 agents, ca. 3750 links) but different types (grid,
preferential attachment, and preferential attachment with triadic closure). Nodes (agents)
with particularly high betweenness centrality highlighted; illustration generated by the
python-networkx module.
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Figure 5: Complementary cumulative distribution of betweenness centrality of the vertices
(agents) in the three networks in figure 4 (log-log plot): Grid (double ring, 4a) light grey,
preferential attachment (4b), grey, and preferential attachment with triadic closure (4c),
dark grey. Betweenness centrality computed with the python-networkx module.
the neighbors of a node are subscribers but the node is not, the dynamic273
(equations eq : abm : 1) yields 0 and the agent will not subscribe; if β > 0,274
there is even a positive probability for subscribers to unsubscribe - which is as275
it should be, but at the macro-level this should result in a very small number276
of unsubscriptions while here it matches every 3rd agent (who is between 2277
subscribers to the left and 2 subscribers to the right). Indeed, this effect278
is much less prominent with a higher neighborhood degree (see figure 8 for279
comparison); the such denser networks will, however, increase computation280
24
time substantially.13 In both grid networks, the catastrophe continues to281
exist and is identical to the theoretical model.282
In a preferential attachment network (figure 9), this seems to change283
slightly. The catastrophe (i.e. the bifurcation, the switch between a regime284
with 1 equilibrium and one with 3 equilibria) is still present, but it seems285
to happen slightly less sudden. This is an illusion. It results from the fact286
that for the area around the bifurcation set in parameter space, different287
parts of the network may converge to different equilibria (yielding a network288
average between the upper and lower equilibria). This is even more pro-289
nounced in the case of preferential attachment networks with triadic closure290
(see below). Further, the effect described for grid networks, a shift of the291
upper equilibrium surface to a lower level) is also present here (and also more292
pronounced because the median neighborhood size is even smaller than for293
the grid network).294
Finally, in a preferential attachment network with triadic closure (figure295
10) the transition seems even more smooth as different parts of the network296
are not strongly connected. This also holds for preferential attachment net-297
13Further, for the network 7, the number of links is such that the network is directly
comparable to a Baraba´si-Albert preferential attachment network of the same size (figure
9).
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works with m = 1 which are entirely loop free. For this case it is obvious298
from figure 10b that even for low values of β there are increasingly large299
parts of the network that converge to the lower equilibrium. Figure 11 shows300
how this changes with the amount of triadic closure. While it is clear that301
if triatic closure were applied permanently for a long time the graph would302
eventually converge to a complete network (with the associated character-303
istics shown above), the figure shows that for even a substantial amount304
(roughly 3 times the number of links present before is added through triadic305
closure) the characteristics of the process are preserved. While the catastro-306
phe is still present - and the macro-level model shown above is therefore a307
suitable first approximation of the situation - the network structure may in308
this case lead to different outcomes in different parts of the network.309
5. Conclusion310
The present work attempted to apply a catastrophe theory model to the311
problem of network industries. A development equation is defined for the312
development of the user base of a technology with network externalities.313
Those not part of the user base are assumed to use a very simple and free314
standard technology or no equivalent technology at all. With the size of the315
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Figure 6: Agent based model on a complete network (1250 agents, 1250× 1249 = 1561250
links).
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Figure 7: Agent based model on a grid (double ring) network (1250 agents, 2500 links).
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(b) Average outcome across 10 runs for
z = 4, s0 = 2
Figure 8: Agent based model on a grid (double ring) network (1250 agents, 12500 links).
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(b) Average outcome across 10 runs for
z = 4, s0 = 2
Figure 9: Agent based model on a preferential attachment network (1250 agents, 2497
links; Baraba´si-Albert with m = 2).
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(b) Average outcome across 10 runs for
z = 4, s0 = 2
Figure 10: Agent based model on a preferential attachment network with triadic closure
(1250 agents, 2499 links, Baraba´si-Albert with m = 1, thus 1249 links, and 1250 random
open triads closed, thus 1249 + 1250 = 2499 links).
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Figure 11: Average outcome across 10 runs for z = 4, s0 = 2 for preferential attachment
networks (Baraba´si-Albert with m = 1, thus 1250 agents, 1249 links) with different degrees
of triadic closure (between 0 additional links, lowest graph, and 3750 additional links,
uppermost graph).
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user base as the only variable, the characteristics of the model depend on316
two control variables, the total population size (capacity boundary) and the317
periodic fixed costs of using the technology.318
The model follows a simple but generalizable layout that includes a pop-319
ulation dynamic with capacity boundary, the network externality in the form320
of a growth rate of the user base14 proportional to the size of the user base,321
and the cost term as an intercept. As was shown in section 3, the model pro-322
duces a cusp catastrophe and it is, in fact, possible to transform the model323
into the classical cusp catastrophe equation. The bifurcations of the model324
occur (1) at zero costs and (2) at a specific relation of costs and the capacity325
boundary. It can be shown, that any factors applied to the network exter-326
nality term would in effect shift this second bifurcation (dividing the cost327
term).328
Further, it was established using an agent-based simulation, that the329
findings of this model are robust with respect to the introduction of a true330
micro-level (interdependent agents) for several network structures (grid net-331
works, Baraba´si-Albert preferential attachment networks, and preferential332
14Or rather, the fitness term that dominates the growth rate as long as the capacity
boundary is not reached.
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attachment networks with triadic closure). While the general behavior - the333
bifurcation, the catastrophe - is preserved, there were some critical changes to334
the macro-level for some network structures. More realistic approximations335
of social networks (and specifically firm networks, with small diameter, high336
clustering, and scale free degree distribution) such as preferential attachment337
networks with triadic closure found that different parts of the network may338
converge to different equilibria. The structure of such networks with several339
well-connected subgraphs that are poorly interconnected through a couple of340
bottleneck nodes, appears to facilitate this outcome.341
As sudden and intense changes in the use of network technologies have342
repeatedly been observed (so in the case of Microsoft’s takeover of the PC343
operating system market in the 1980s, but also in the case of the rise and fall344
of MySpace, in the rise of tablet computers, etc.) catastrophe models may345
indeed be a promising approach to explaining the specific dynamics of these346
sectors. This is particularly relevant as it is clear that they are subject to347
increasing returns to the size of the user base (which allows the introduction348
of many non-trivial strategies on the part of the market participants), that349
many standard models focusing on equilibrium concepts are therefore not350
applicable, and that the reasons for the asymmetric industry structure in351
31
almost all of these sectors are not entirely understood.15352
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